human-style language is necessary for having a mind (at least in anything remotely like the human sense), then either language is a prerequisite for mind (and for such characteristically "higher" mental capacities as cognitive agency) or the two must arise simultaneously. Either way, an innate language capacity of one form or another -presumably delivered by evolution -seems all but impossible to avoid. Language is not something that human beings worked out collectively; it is effectively hard-wired in. Such a conclusion will be hard to accept for anyone hewing more to the empiricist than the rationalist tradition.
Such philosophers as Albert Newen, Andreas Bartels (Newen & Bartels, 2007) , and Colin Allen (1999) offer an alternative -one that resonates well with comparative cognition research. Conceptual agency 1 exists along a continuum where it is appropriate to attribute some substantial degree of it so soon as an agent, through its behavior, exhibits a capacity to categorize the world, create novel categories, apply those categories to new circumstances, and -most importantly, perhaps -express surprise when the resulting expectations get violated. None of that prima facie requires language. What language does (see e.g. Parthemore, 2014 ) is not to make conceptual agency possible in the first place but allow pre-existing concepts to be contemplated on much more abstract levels and new, abstract concepts to be created that were not previously possible -all of which allows the agent to step further back from the present moment and engage in longer and longer ranging mental time travel (MTT). That is to say that the Bischof-Köhler Hypothesis promoted by Thomas Suddendorf and Michael Corballis (e.g., 2007 ) is wrong -but only for the absolute divide it creates, not for its intuition that there is something unique about human MTT.
Of course if one views conceptual agency as existing along a continuum then one can, and should, argue about where to draw the line even as one should probably be prepared to shift that line depending on the present context of discussion: that is to say, the line should be pragmatic, not absolute. Viewing conceptual agency in this way is shown to fit in nicely with recent discussions from e.g. Merlin Donald (2001 , 1993 ), Jordan Zlatev (2005 Zlatev et al, 2005) and others suggesting that mimesis (roughly, systematically structured imitative behavior) is one of the necessary steps, both ontogenetically and phylogenetically, on the road to language as a facility that arises naturally out of a cultural context, beginning from episodic memory (itself already conceptually structured), rather than anything innate. As Donald writes (1998:185) : "humans are undoubtedly unique in their spontaneous invention of language and symbols; but, as I have argued elsewhere… our special advantage is more on the production side than on the conceptual side of the ledger. Animals know much more than they can express."
